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ON THE ALLOCATION OF BURDENS OF 
* PROOF IN CORPORATE LAW: AN ESSAY 
ON FAIRNESS AND FUZZY SETS 
Charles M. Yablon * 
I. A DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM 
The legal rules governing liability of corporate officers and direc­
tors for breach of fiduciary duty contain few, if any, categorical 
prohibitions on the kinds of transactions that may be conducted by 
corporate management. Rather, the rules operate (and are generally 
believed to deter a certain amount of managerial misconduct) by 
describing the effect of undertaking certain types of transactions on 
the allocation of the burden of proof in a subsequent lawsuit against 
such officers or directors for breach of fiduciary duty. Burdens of 
proof are described as "shifting" back and forth between plaintiffs and 
defendants, bouncing between them like a tennis ball. 
Thus we are told that: 
[A] plaintiff attacking a corporate payment has the heavy burden 
of demonstrating that no reasonable businessman could find that 
adequate consideration had been supplied for the payment. How­
ever, where the directors have a personal interest in the application 
of the corporate payments, such as where they are fixing their own 
compensation, the business judgment rule no longer applies and 
the burden shifts to the directors to demonstrate affirmatively that 
the transactions were engaged in with good faith and were fair, i.e., 
that adequate consideration had been supplied.' 
However, if there has been a ratification of the transaction by a major­
ity of the disinterested directors or shareholders, the burden shifts yet 
figain and, "the objecting stockholder has the burden of showing that 
no person of ordinary sound business judgment would say that the 
consideration received for the options was a fair exchange for the op­
tions granted."^ 
Given all this discussion of shifting burdens of proof, some stu­
dents get the mistaken impression that proof standards change during 
* Professor of Law. Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. A.B., 1972, Columbia; J.D., 
1975, Yale. I wish to thank Professor Lotfi Zadeh for his thoughtful comments on an earlier 
draft of this piece. I hasten to add that any errors this piece contains concerning fuzzy set 
theory are entirely the product of my own limited understanding of these matters. 
» Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739-40 (7th Cir. 1979); see also, Marciano v. Nakash, 535 
A.2d 400 (Del. 1987). 
2 Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979). 
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the course of a trial for breach of fiduciary duty. The language in 
which these rules are stated makes it sound as if the courts must first 
make a preliminary determination as to whether the transaction in­
volves self-dealing or has been ratified by disinterested directors, and 
then, on the basis of that determination, allocate to one side or the 
other the burden of proving the fairness or unfairness of the 
transaction. 
In fact, these burden-shifting rules have nothing to do with trial 
procedure or the presentation of evidence. In fiduciary duty trials, as 
in most other trials, attorneys for plaintiffs present their case first and 
put forth all evidence they have on self-dealing, fairness, and any 
other relevant issues. Defendants follow and do the same. The par­
ties may not even know who has been allocated the burden of persua­
sion on the fairness issue until they read in the judge's opinion 
whether or not the appropriate evidentiary standard has been met.^ 
In short, the rules governing allocations of burdens of proof in 
corporate law are not designed to affect the presentation of evidence 
at trial; rather they are a way of structuring the decision-making pro­
cess of the finder of fact, who, in these kinds of cases, is usually the 
same judge who will be deciding such legal issues as the appropriate 
allocation of the burden of proof. Once we recognize this, however, 
another problem arises, and that is the one which this paper seeks to 
address. 
Simply put, the question is. Why is it so important which side has 
the burden of proof to establish fairness and similar issues in fiduciary 
duty litigation? That it does matter seems to be a very basic assump­
tion of this area of corporate law. Courts spend much time and effort 
in their opinions discussing and clarifying exactly who has the burden 
of persuasion on each aspect of the claim. Statutes and even Ameri­
can Law Institute ("ALI") restatements are explicit in allocating such 
burdens.^ Certainly, the common assumption among corporate law 
practitioners is that if your client has the burden of proof in these 
matters, you are very, very likely to lose the case.' 
3 Where factual issues are being tried to a jury, some allocation of burdens would have to 
be made at the time of the judge's charge. But jury trials are rare in breach of fiduciary duty 
cases in state courts. Before the Delaware Court of Chancery, the most important venue for 
such claims, they are nonexistent. 
* See e.g, CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a)(3)(West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713(b) 
(McKinney 1991); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §§ 5.02(b), 5.04(b) (Tent. Draft 
No. 5, 1986). 
' " '[Bjecause the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so pow­
erful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the appropriate stan­
dard of judicial review frequently is determinative of the outcome of derivative litigation.' " 
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I As a former corporate lawyer, I share those assumptions, yet I 
iind them at odds with the theoretical hterature involving burdens of 
proof in civil actions. That work implies that the allocation of the 
burden of proof should be relatively unimportant in all but a small 
number of civil cases, and rarely significant on the issue of fairness. 
After all, the basic standard of proof in almost all corporate actions, 
including breach of fiduciary duty cases, is the preponderance of the 
evidence.® Most of the theoretical work involving the civil burden of 
proof assumes that a preponderance standard requires no more than a 
showing that the disputed fact is "more likely than not" to be the 
case, or that the probability of its occurrence is greater than fifty per­
cent.' The standard is justified, moreover, since any greater demon­
stration of the probability of the disputed fact would increase the 
likelihood of erroneous determinations either against plaintiffs or de­
fendants. The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard has the virtue 
of keeping the risk of erroneous determinations as equal as possible 
between plaintiffs and defendants, thus maintaining the neutrality be­
tween parties that is appropriate in civil actions.® 
Under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof, allo­
cation of the burden of persuasion should rarely be important. If 
some evidence on the issue is available, enough that the court can 
form some rational (albeit subjective) assessment of the likelihood of 
the disputed fact, allocation of the burden of persuasion should only 
matter where that assessment is exactly fifty percent. If the judge be­
lieves it is even slightly more probable than not that the terms of the 
transaction are fair, if she finds, for example, that the testimony of 
plaintiff's expert is just a bit more'credible than that of the defendant 
concerning the appropriate valuation of the stock at issue, alligation 
of the burden of proof should become unimportant. A detemination 
that there is a fifty-one percent probability in favor of one side or the 
other should be dispositive, irrespective of the allocation of the bur­
den of proof. 
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.. 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Dd. 1989) (quoting AC Ac­
quisitions Corp. V. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
6 See e.g., Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974). 
7 See Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, in PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE IN 
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 21, 27 (P. Tillers & E. Green eds. 1988); Lempert, The New Evidence 
Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, in PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 61, 71 (P. Tillers & E. Green eds. 1988). u, m v ^ 
8 See Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked 
Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation. 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RK. J. «7 
of Professor Kaye's defense of the "more probable than not" standard, O^loff & St^'nge > 
A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard. 131 U. PA. L. KEV. 
1159 (1983); Allen, supra note 7, at 27-29. 
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Allocation issues will admittedly still be important in those cases 
in which the issue is one on which neither side is able to adduce any 
evidence (e.g., whether defendant manufactured the defective product 
purchased by plaintiff many years ago'). It seems unlikely, however, 
that the dispositive issue in a breach of fiduciary duty case, particu­
larly the issue of fairness, is likely to be one on which little or no 
evidence is available. Quite the contrary, the fairness of a given trans­
action is an issue on which experts can almost always be found to 
testify for both sides, creating the kind of "battle of the experts" also 
found in medical malpractice cases, condemnation proceedings and 
certain other kinds of litigation. It seems unlikely that an experienced 
finder of fact, hearing all the expert testimony subjected to competent 
cross examination, would not find herself at least somewhat per­
suaded that one or the other side had the stronger position. Even if 
both experts' testimony were exactly equal in persuasive power, the 
judge could still look to other circumstances surrounding the transac­
tion, such as the negotiation process, the nature and extent of the bar­
gaining, and the terms of the deal itself—all of this evidence relating 
to the fairness of the transaction.'® It is hard to believe that a judge, 
after considering all this evidence, will generally be unable to con­
clude that a preponderance favors one or the other side. 
Indeed, cases considering the fairness or unfairness of a recent 
corporate transaction are very different from the sparsely evidenced 
issues which concern most theoretical work on civil burdens of proof. 
The theoretical work usually deals with cases where evidence on some 
crucial issue, such as causation or identity, is either entirely lacking or 
available only in a weak or attenuated form." In fairness cases, how­
ever, the court will generally have available to it all relevant facts 
' See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 
132 (1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). 
10 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (fairness determina­
tions include "questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, 
negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and stockholders 
were obtained" as well as the "economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, 
including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects . . . ."); see also 
Simpson, The Emerging Role of the Special Committee, 43 Bus. LAW. 665, 685-87 (1988). 
1 • The "blue bus" hypothetical, for example, involves a plaintiff who, having been negli­
gently run over by a blue bus, can only adduce evidence of identity which establishes that 
defendant operates 60% of the blue buses in town. Most commentators assume that such a 
showing of identity would not be sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict, let 
alone sustain the burden of persuasion at trial. Yet these commentators have not been able to 
produce an entirely satisfactory account of why this should be so. David Kaye suggests that 
the failure of plaintiff to submit any stronger evidence of identity is itself a relevant fact for the 
fact finder to consider and may well justify the fact finder in forming a subjective probability 
that the likelihood that defendant owned the bus is less than 50%. See Kaye, The Paradox of 
the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101. 
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concerning the transaction itself, accounts by all the major partici­
pants as to how the deal was negotiated, as well as expert opinions as 
to its fairness. Considering all the evidence as to whether the deal was 
fair, and a burden of proof that makes even a slightly stronger show­
ing for one side or the other dispositive, why is corporate litigation so 
obsessed with allocating the burden of proof? 
To answer this question, one must recognize the rather peculiar 
way in which the fairness of the transaction constitutes a factual issue 
for the court. Fairness, as I hope to show in the following section, is 
treated by the courts not as a distinct property which either does or 
does not characterize the transaction, but rather as a "fuzzy" prop­
erty which may characterize a transaction to various degrees. In the 
third section, I hope to show that recent work that has been done on 
the logic of propositions involving such fuzzy properties (so-called 
"fuzzy set theory") can illuminate the role of allocations of burdens of 
proof in this area of corporate law. 
Before going on to this paper's next two sections, however, I 
want to consider two preliminary objections to the problem as I have 
posed it. 
Most careful corporate lawyers would rightly note that the legal 
standards applicable to transactions subject to the business judgment 
rule (or applicable to transactions ratified by shareholders or disinter­
ested directors), and those legal standards applicable to self-dealing or 
interested-director transactions, involve more than just a shift in the 
burden of proof. Interested-director transactions constitute a breach 
of fiduciary duty unless they are "intrinsically fair" to the corpora­
tion.'^ Transactions subject to the business judgment rule, in con­
trast, or those ratified by the appropriate disinterested groups, only 
breach management's fiduciary duty if they involve "waste" or a 
"gift" of corporate assets.*^ 
The difference between the "intrinsic fairness" and "waste" stan­
dards is more than a difference in the allocation of the burden of 
proof. It seems to involve a substantive difference in the kind of thing 
that must be proven to establish liability, like the difference between 
negligence and recklessness in tort law, or the difference between a 
complaint which merely fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of 
12 This is said to be an "exacting standard," requiring rigorous judicial scrutiny of the 
transaction with regard to both "fair dealing" and *'fair price." Block, Radin & Rosenzweig, 
The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in Shareholder Litigation at the Turn of the Decade, 
45 Bus. LAW. 469, 491 (1990). 
13 Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979); Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 160 
A.2d 731 (1960). 
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure'^ and one which is "frivolous" 
and triggers sanctions under rule 11.'® 
But even after one acknowledges, as I think one must, that there 
is this substantive diflFerence in relevant standards, the fact remains 
that corporate law judges are quite insistent that their rules involve 
not only substantive differences in standards, but also shifts in alloca­
tions of the burden of proof. Unlike tort law, where plaintiff has the 
burden of proving either negligence or recklessness, or under the Fed­
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, where defendants must establish either 
failure to state a claim or frivolousness, the structure of the corporate 
law rules implies that requiring defendants to prove fairness, rather 
than simply easing the burden on plaintiffs from a showing of waste to 
unfairness, constitutes an additional serious hardship to defendants 
that renders their case significantly more difficult. The question re­
mains, therefore, in light of the preponderance of the evidence stan­
dard, why shifting the allocation of the burden of proof is believed to 
have this significant impact on the outcome of cases. 
Furthermore, while waste and intrinsic fairness do seem to be 
different substantive standards, they do not appear to measure en­
tirely different things. Quite the contrary, waste is usually defined in 
terms of particularly egregious or extreme forms of unfairness. If so, 
the analysis of fairness as a fuzzy variable admitting of various de­
grees may not only shed some light on the allocation of burdens of 
proof, but may also help define the relationship between the fairness 
and waste standards. 
The other preliminary objection to the problem I have posed 
would be that, despite all the judicial talk about allocations of burdens 
of proof, such allocations are not really very significant after all. I 
have heard this view expressed by some lawyers who frequently liti­
gate corporate law issues. These lawyers maintain that despite all the 
judicial attention to allocation of burdens of proof, the dispositive is­
sue in all such cases is whether or not the judge is convinced that the 
transaction at issue is fair.'® This also appears to be the view of Dean 
Robert Clark, who in his recent treatise on corporate law describes 
the "basic self-dealing" standard as "a fairness test," and devotes only 
14 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
15 FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
1® The proverbial "smell test" used in Delaware proceeds upon the theory that if the terms 
of the underlying transaction stink badly enough, the courts will find a way to abrogate any 
procedural protections supplied by the business judgment rule. See e.g., Mundheim & Block, 
The Business Judgment Rule, in TWENTIETH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULA­
TION 173, 180-81 (C. Nathan, H. Pitt & S. Volk eds. 1989). 
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ie sentence to allocation of the burden of proof. 
Note, however, that viewing the crucial issue as one of "fairness" 
not necessarily inconsistent with viewing the allocation of the bur­
den of proof as playing an important role in that determination. Cer­
tainly, if a judge is convinced that the transaction at issue is fair, she 
J will not award any relief.'® The real question is whether the judge's 
determination of whether a transaction is fair or not is significantly 
affected by which party has the burden of proof on that issue, and 
whether those actions which allegedly shift the burden of proof, such 
as disinterested director approval, really do affect substantive legal 
outcomes. 
It is possible, of course, to answer this question in the negative. 
We have already noted that, for the corporate litigator, the allocation 
of burdens has no effect on his presentation of evidence at trial. The 
attorneys for both parties will simply present the strongest evidence 
they can on the fairness issue. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
some attorneys may believe that the dispositive factor is always the 
strength of their presentation, not the allocation of the burden of per­
suasion. Some might even agree that considerations such as disinter­
ested-director approval might have an effect on the outcome, but only 
because it is a factor in the court's fairness determination, not because 
it "shifts" the burden of proof. 
These are plausible views, and they derive much of their stren^h 
from the previously noted fact that it is hard to understand why, 
given our standard view of the burden of proof, the burden's alloca­
tion should be a significant factor in fairness cases. Even if we accept 
the view that allocation rules are mostly judicial smoke and mirrors, 
masking what is in every case a straightforward determination of the 
fairness or unfairness of the transaction, the persistence of and the 
attention given to allocation-of-burden-of-proof rules in judicial opin­
ions must still be explained. Why do courts insist on describing disin­
terested-director approval as an action which shifts the burden of 
proof, rather than simply a factor to be considered in determining the 
overall fairness of the transaction? 
In short, rejection of the view that allocation-of-burden-of-proof 
rules are important in corporate-law adjudication does not solve the 
R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, §§ 5.2-.3 (1986). 
Alternatively, if a judge finds a transaction to involve substantial unfairness, she will 
grant relief to the plaintiff. The one situation in which the doctrinal formulations suggest there 
might be a departure from a straight fairness standard is when the transaction is perhaps 
"somewhat" or "slightly" unfair, but has been approved by disinterested directors and/or rati­
fied by shareholders and is not so egregious as to constitute waste. This problem is analyzed 
more fully in the third section of this paper. 
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problem to which this paper is addressed, but merely reposes the 
problem in a new form. If the allocation rules simply function as a 
"tie-breaker" when the evidence from both parties is equally unper-
suasive, we are still left wondering why so many corporate lawyers 
and judges take these rules so seriously, and why lawyers and judges 
view these rules as potentially dispositive in many cases. 
II. FAIRNESS AS A FUZZY PROPERTY 
In order to answer the question posed in the preceding section, 
we should take a closer look at what it means to describe a given 
transaction as fair or unfair. Fairness, as that term is understood and 
used in fiduciary-duty litigation, is a property which may characterize 
transactions in various degrees. Like the properties of being tall or 
pretty or old or hot. a deal may be fair to various degrees: that is, it is 
plausible and sensible to speak of deals that are very fair to sharehold­
ers, somewhat fair, almost fair, and egregiously unfair, just as it is 
intelligible to speak of things as very tall, * somewhat pretty, or ex­
tremely hot." 
While many may find it intuitively obvious that fairness is a 
"fuzzy" property, to others, the term almost fair in the context of 
transactions may sound as strange as almost pregnant or almost evenly 
divisible by 7. Such people may have in mind the economic definition 
of fair price as the price at which a willing seller and willing buyer 
would agree to an exchange, or may envision a chart in which the 
supply and demand curves for a particular commodity meet at a sin­
gle point which defines both the amount that will be produced and its 
fair price. At the more mundane level, many items do have a single, 
nonfuzzy fair price. If the bus fare is $1.15, it is, on a plausible use of 
the language, unfair to ask any more or less than that. 
Yet economists recognize that under many circumstances, there 
can be no single easily defined and ascertainable fair price, even as a 
matter of economic theory. Rather, the theory can only define a fair; 
range of prices. One circumstance under which this fair range of 
prices may occur is bilateral monopoly. Assume that A owns the only 
piece of land in the area that has oil underneath it, but B owns the 
only drilling equipment and is the only one who knows how to use it.f 
Together they can produce a well worth $1,000. Separately the land' 
and drilling equipment are worthless. Obviously, it is efficient (that is,) 
it will maximize A and B's aggregate wealth) for the two to agree in 
some way, whether by B purchasing the land from A, by A leasing the 
'9 See Zadeh, Fuzzy Logic, COMPUTER, April 1988, at 83. 
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equipment from B, or by some other joint arrangement. But any 
agreement they reach concerning division of the $1,000 increase in 
value created by their drilling venture is equally fair from the point of 
view of economic theory. While it would be inefficient for A to de­
mand $1,500 for land that could only produce $1,000 in incremental 
value, economic theory has nothing to say about the fairness of any 
price .4 might charge between $1 and $999. Accordingly, one might 
say that in cases of bilateral monopoly, economists recognize that the 
efficiency gains obtainable from cooperation define a range of fair allo­
cations of those efficiency gains. 
Economists also recognize that a range of fair prices can occur in 
the absence of complete information about the item being sold. Con­
sider a thing of value, say, a promissory note from Mr. X, promising 
to pay $1,000 at the end of the year. Obviously, the note will be 
worth $1,000 on the day Mr. X pays it, but there is the possibility that 
other events will occur in the interim, such as X might go bankrupt or 
flee the country, which would make the note worthless. On this sim­
plified model, we can say that the value of the note today is its value 
at maturity multiplied by the likelihood or probability that it will be 
paid at maturity.^" If we believe there is a ten percent chance that X 
will be bankrupt by the end of the year, the note will be worth only 
$900 today. If we decide that the probability of bankruptcy is fifty 
percent, the fair value of the note is $500. Determining the likelihood 
of some future event is almost always going to be a matter of informed 
speculation. Accordingly, if we decide that X'% bankruptcy is not 
very likely, we might put its probability at between one percent and 
ten percent, thereby creating a range of fair values of between $990 
and $900 for the promissory note. We might conclude that such a 
range of fair prices was the best we could do in valuing the note, 
either because no further information about X^% financial condition 
was available or because the cost of gathering the information was 
greater than the benefit obtainable from that information.^' 
I would suggest that problems of prediction and bilateral monop­
oly are almost invariably involved in fiduciary duty cases. The very 
common situation of the corporate "freeze-out," in which a majority 
20 For the sake of simplicity, we are purposely ignoring the problem of discounting the 
value at maturity to its present value. For a discussion of such discounting, see W. KLEIN & J. 
COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE, 280-88 (4th ed. 1990). 
21 If the point of any further investigation is to enable us to determine which value between 
$900 and $990 is the fair price to pay for the note, it would be irrational (in an economic sense) 
to spend more than $90 to obtain such further information. If it would cost more than $90 to 
obtain that additional information, then the range of fair values is the best information about 
price that is rationally obtainable. 
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shareholder of a corporation purchases all the outstanding shares of 
the minority, involves a classic bilateral monopoly situation. The ma­
jority shareholder, by virtue of its controlling position with the corpo­
ration, is the only potential buyer of the minority shares, and there are 
no adequate substitutes for the minority shares it seeks to purchase. 
Accordingly, there is no single fair price at which the shares should be 
purchased, but rather a range of values defined by the difierence be­
tween the value of the stock if it stays in minority hands and the in­
cremental value the majority holder expects to receive from the 
purchase. 
Even more common in corporate law is the lack of complete in­
formation necessary to arrive at a single fair price. The value of most 
corporations and other profit-making enterprises, as well as the stock 
which represents claims on the control and future profits of such en­
terprises, is generally thought to be most accurately determined by 
computing the present value of the likely future income or cash flows 
anticipated from the enterprise. Such an analysis necessarily involves 
making speculative and imperfectly informed predictions about the 
future business and financial prospects of the enterprise. It is not sur­
prising that valuations based on such speculative and uncertain data 
can yield no more than a range of potentially fair prices. 
Viewing fairness in corporate law as a property involving a range 
of values is not only justified by economic theory, but is reflected in 
practice as well. When investment bankers are asked to elucidate the 
meaning of the formal "opinions" they issue in connection with 
tender offers or other corporate combinations, in which they state that 
the price being offered to shareholders is fair, they are careful to point 
out that they are not defining that price as the single fair price. 
Rather, they are simply giving an opinion that the price is within the 
fair range, again implicitly recognizing a certain fuzziness in the pa­
rameters of fairness. 
The clearest statement that fairness is a fuzzy property for corpo­
rate law purposes is to be found in the Revised Model Business Cor­
poration Act ("RMBCA") which notes: 
22 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) presents the classic situation. The 
majority shareholder had studies performed which indicated that purchase of the remaining 
49.5% of the company would be a "good investment" at up to $24 per share. The stock was 
then selling at about $14.50 per share in the market. The majority shareholder offered the 
minority $21 per share in a transaction ultimately held to be unfair to the minority. See also 
discussion of the "self dealing surplus" in R. CLARK, supra note 17, § 5.4.2 
23 In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d. 858 (Del. 1985), the response of the target com­
pany's chief financial officer to a takeover bid which was favored by the target's President (but 
probably not by the chief financial officer) was that it was "in the range of a fair price," but "at 
the beginning of the range." Id. at 869. 
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If the issue in a transaction is the "fairness" of a price, "fair" is not 
to be taken to imply that there is a single "fair" price, all others 
being "unfair." It has long been settled that a "fair" price is any 
price in that broad range which an unrelated party might have 
been willing to pay or willing to accept, as the case may be, for the 
property, following a normal arm's-length business negotiation, in 
the light of the knowledge that would have been reasonably ac­
quired in the course of such negotiations, any result within that 
range being "fair" . . . 
Even when we have established that fairness in fiduciary-duty lit­
igation is a property defined by a range of values, we still have not 
established that such fairness is a fuzzy property. Consider the fol­
lowing statements: (1) "X is tall"; and (2) "X is an American citizen." 
Both statements ascribe certain properties to X. Both properties in­
volve a range of values, in that we can imagine people of very different 
descriptions and backgrounds for whom these would be true state­
ments. But the property of being tall is one that can be used to rank 
those who possess it in varying degrees. For any two people appropri­
ately described as tall, we can determine whether one is taller than the 
other. We can also ascribe degrees of tallness like very tall, kind of 
tall, extremely tall, not very tall. The property of being an American 
citizen, by contrast, cannot be used to rank those who possess it. It 
makes little sense to speak of someone being more of an American 
citizen than someone else, or to speak of someone being very much an 
American citizen or just a little bit an American citizen. 
What kind of property is fairness? The section of commentary 
from the Revised Model Business Corporation Act quoted above, as 
well as the economic theory previously discussed, would seem to im­
ply that fairness involves a range of values that cannot ordinally be 
ranked. If it is determined, for example, that a willing buyer and a 
willing seller in (for example) a bilateral monopoly situation, would 
agree to a price between $5 and $10 per share, then both economic 
theory and the RMBCA tell us that "any result within that range" is 
"fair."" 
Here, however, I think there is a crucial difference in perspective 
between those, like economists and the RMBCA commentators, who 
are seeking to define an abstract notion of fairness, and the perspec­
tive of a judge in an actually litigated fiduciary-duty case. The judge 
is considering a challenge to the fairness of a certain transaction/ram 
the perspective of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's claim, after all, is not 
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.61, note on Fair Transactions (1989). 
25 Id. 
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that the transaction is unfair in the abstract, but that it is unfair to the 
plaintiff. 
There is a significant difference between the determination that a 
price is fair in the abstract, and that it is fair to a particular individual. 
We might determine, for example, that a fair price for a cup of coffee, 
based on a survey of local coflFee shops, is a range from $.50 to $.70. 
The question, whether a price of $.50 is fair or not, would, from an 
abstract perspective, be uncertain, depending on how wide we deter­
mine the range of fairness to be. From the perspective of the pur­
chaser of the $.50 cup of coffee, however, aware that he often pays 
more, $.50 seems an eminently fair price. By the same token, if asked 
to pay $.70, our disgruntled purchaser might comment that such a 
price was barely fair, or hardly fair or even a little unfair. 
From the perspective of a certain individual or class of individu­
als, therefore, the fairness of various prices can be quite easily com­
pared and ranked. From the perspective of shareholders whose 
interest in a company has been purchased by a majority shareholder 
in a cash out merger, for example, there is no doubt that $20 a share is 
fairer than $ 15, and $25 is fairer still. Accordingly, from the perspec­
tive of the judge in a fiduciary duty case, whose job it is to decide 
whether the price paid by defendants was fair to the plaintiff, the issue 
of faimess-to-the-plaintifiF presents itself as a fuzzy property.^® 
Consider then the issue of fairness as it is likely to be presented to 
the judge in a fiduciary-duty litigation. There will rarely be any dis­
pute about the amount actually being offered in the transaction. Say, 
for purposes of the following hypothetical, that it is $25 per share, 
offered by the majority shareholder to purchase all the remaining mi­
nority shares of the company. If the market price for the stock in the 
preceding year has averaged $20 per share, everyone might agree that 
a price below $20 would be very unfair, and by the same token, it 
might generally be agreed that a fifty percent premium over that mar­
ket price, or $30 per share, was undeniably within the range of fair­
ness to the plaintiff. But the judge must decide whether $25 per share, 
a price which, on our hypothetical, is neither clearly fair nor clearly 
unfair, is fair for purposes of the lawsuit. 
Note, moreover, that it is probably no accident that the price ' 
26 A fuzzy set is a class with fuzzy boundaries. "Such a class, say F, may be characterized 
by associating with each object a in a universe of discourse U the grade of membership ofu in 
F." L. Zadeh, Fuzzy Sets, Usuality and Common Sense Reasoning 4 (Oct. 2, 1985) (unpub­
lished manuscript). For our purposes at the moment, the universe of discourse contains the 
prices at which minority shares may be purchased, with F being the property of being fair to 
minority shareholders. F is a fuzzy property because any price u may be associated with a 
grade of membership of u in F—i.e., any price possesses some degree of fairness. 
1991] BURDENS OF PROOF 509 
being considered by the judge falls right in the middle of the fuzzy 
range. The majority shareholder has an obvious economic interest in 
paying as little for the stock as possible, and has presumably asked its 
lawyers and financial advisors, in originally structuring this transac­
tion, what was likely to be the lowest amount that it could pay and 
still have a good chance of winning the subsequent lawsuit. While 
natural or professional caution and uncertainty might cause such ad­
visors to err on the side of generosity to shareholders, it seems far 
more likely that the dominant motive will be economic, and will in­
cline lawyers and financial advisors to approve prices that will present 
hard cases to the judge—prices that might be described in the vocabu­
lary of fuzziness as just barely fair or minimally fair or not quite fair. 
If this analysis is correct, determining whether a price in fiduci­
ary duty litigation is fair is a difficult question in much the same way 
that it is a difficult question whether a man whose height is 5 feet IOV2 
inches is tall or a temperature of seventy-eight degrees Fahrenheit in 
June is hot. In all of these cases, the problem is not a lack of informa­
tion about the thing to be evaluated (we know exactly what the price, 
height or temperature is). Rather, it is the nature of the criteria we 
are using to evaluate the thing which leads to uncertainty in the evalu­
ation. Since those criteria are not crisply defined, but fuzzy, we may 
find it difficult to give a simple yes or no answer to the question 
presented. 
The mere fact that legally dispositive criteria are fuzzy and not 
crisp, however, is not necessarily grounds for condemning them. We 
can imagine a legal regime in which all legally dispositive terms had 
crisp definitions—in which only men 6 feet or over were tall; in which 
only June days over eighty degrees were hot; and in which only 
freeze-out merger prices at least twenty-five percent above average-
market price for the previous year were fair. Any gains in clarity 
from such a regime might well be outweighed by the loss in flexibil­
ity—e.g., does the same definition of tallness apply to Swedish and 
Japanese men? Is a hot day in early June as hot as one on June 30? Is 
a fixed percentage above market a reliable criteria in all cash freeze-
out mergers? If one agrees that the answer to some of these questions 
may be no, one can begin to appreciate that legal standards may util­
ize fuzzy criteria and yet be preferable to the available crisp 
alternatives. 
How do courts go about making determinations, like the deter­
mination concerning fairness, which involve applications of fuzzy cri­
teria to often largely undisputed facts? It is here, I believe, that work 
from the field of fuzzy set theory can provide lawyers with certain 
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insights. The following section attempts, in a preliminary way, to 
consider some applications of fuzzy set theory to understanding the 
role of allocations of burdens of proof. 
III. FUZZY SET THEORY AND ALLOCATIONS OF THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF 
Standard logic, which utilizes the law of the excluded middle, 
holds that every variable x either has the property P or the property 
not P. Put slightly more colloquially, everything is either red or not 
red, divisible by two or not divisible by two. President of the United 
States or not President of the United States. From the perspective of 
set theory, everything is either a member of the set of red things or it 
is not. Everything is either a member of the set of things divisible by 
two, or it is not. 
Fuzzy set theory relaxes the law of the excluded middle to the 
extent of recognizing that some variables may be neither fully mem­
bers of a set nor fully excluded from it. Consider the set of tall people. 
Some individuals may be definitely tall and others definitely not tall, 
while yet others may be kind of tall or somewhat tall or not very tall. 
Fuzzy set theory assigns to those variables which are fully members of 
the set (i.e., definitely tall) the value of 1, and to those which are not 
at all members of the set (i.e., definitely not tall) a value of 0. But 
fuzzy set theory also permits, as standard logic does not, that a varia­
ble may be a member of a set at some value between 1 and 0. So, a 
variable having a .2 membership in the set might be considered to 
correspond to someone just barely tall, while .5 membership might be 
somewhat tall and .8 membership rather tall.^'' 
Thus, fuzzy set theory captures the cardinal ranking that is possi­
ble with fuzzy properties. It makes it possible for systems analysts to 
create computer systems which model the decision processes of ex­
perts in various fields, fields whose experts utilize fuzzy properties like 
hot, tall, etc., in making their decisions. Properties like very hot, not 
very hot, somewhat hot and not too hot can be assigned numerical 
values, and computers can be programmed to, for example, start the 
manufacturing process when the machinery is somewhat hot and 
monitor the process to prevent the machinery from becoming very 
27 The ways in which these numerical values are assigned to linguistic variables remains 
unclear, and a number of methods have been suggested. 2^deh, supra note 26, at 5-8. One 
must recognize, of course, that in shifting from words to numbers, one cannot supply these 
fuzzy predicates with any more crispness than they originally had. 
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hot.^® 
Obviously, fuzzy set theory cannot tell judges how to decide fair­
ness issues in fiduciary duty litigation. What it can do is provide us 
with a way of thinking about the difficulties in factual determinations 
involving fuzzy properties. Consider again the hypothetical freeze-
out case, where a majority stockholder offers to purchase minority-
held stock for $25 per share. We might assign to the certainly fair 
price of $30 a value of 1, and to the certainly unfair price of $20 a 
value of 0. The transaction price, which is exactly halfway between 
these points, might be considered a .5 on a cardinal ranking of possi­
ble prices. The question then becomes whether .5 degree of fairness is 
sufficient to satisfy the standards imposed by the corporate law rules. 
Fuzzy set theory obviously cannot tell us that, but it does tell us to 
pay careful attention to the precise verbal formulations decision mak­
ers use in describing their decision making processes.^' 
Fuzzy set theory uses the verbal gradations implicit in such 
terms as not very hot, kind of hot, and rather hot as ways of indicating 
the degree to which certain objects are members of the set of hot 
things. Consider two responses to the question. Is that coffee hot? 
The first response is, no; the second is, not very hot. Both are nega­
tive answers, and in a world in which only yes-no bipolar answers are 
recognized, both no and not very hot would count as no. But if we 
are attuned to various degrees of yes and no, we quickly recognize 
that coffee which is not hot may be quite different from coffee which is 
not very hot. Whereas coffee that was not hot would have a value of 0 
in the set of hot things, coffee which is not very hot might still be a .5 
or .6 member of such a set. Put colloquially, tepid coffee or lukewarm 
coffee would still be not very hot. 
What does this have to do with determinations of fairness in fidu­
ciary duty litigation? Consider again the question. Is that coffee hot? 
It is an ambiguous question in that we do not know whether, in asking 
about the fuzzy predicate hot, the questioner meant piping hot or just 
not ice cold. Is any value below 1 (say, piping hot) excluded or are 
only values below .2 (tepid) excluded? Consider again the answer. 
Not very hot. It responds to the ambiguity of the question by provid­
ing greater specificity, as well as by giving greater definition to the 
criteria being used in the answer (i.e., I am interpreting the ques-
28 See Zadeh, The Role of Fuzzy Logic in the Management of Uncertainty in Expert Systems 
in 2 FUZZY SETS AND SYSTEMS 199, 199-227 (1983). 
29 Zadeh, A Computational Theory of Dispositions, 2 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTEL­
LIGENT SYSTEMS 39, 40 (1987) (describing the need to restore suppressed or implicit fuzzy 
quantifiers in ordinary language). 
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tioner's criteria for hot to mean very hot and am answering the ques­
tion, Is that coffee hot?—no). 
The question, Is the transaction price fair? is also, as we have 
seen, an ambiguous question in that it does not tell the judge the de­
gree of fairness that must characterize the transaction to satisfy the 
criteria. But the judicial opinions themselves, in seeking to answer 
that question, may provide their own subtle indication of the criteria 
they are actually applying. The case law often states that the criteria 
for approval of these transactions is not just fairness, but full fair­
ness,^" "entire fairness,"^' "intrinsic faimess,"^^ or "the most scrupu­
lous inherent fairness."'^ 
Little attention has been paid to these extra adjectives, and in­
deed, it is difficult to define, in any abstract sense, what the difference 
between fairness and entire fairness or intrinsic fairness might be. Yet 
in the context of fairness as a fuzzy property, there seems little doubt 
that all these adjectives function as intensifiers to the property "fair­
ness" and as such, send a subtle message to the judge concerning the 
substantive criteria to be used in determining fairness. In our hypo­
thetical, the judge may be quite uncertain whether $25 is a fair price 
for the stock, but as she peruses the case law, and is instructed to rule 
against any prices not fully or entirely or inherently fair, she will view 
these adjectives as setting a higher standard than mere fairness— 
something akin to a very fair standard. 
The result is that these rules, while phrased in terms of shifting 
the burden of proof, also change the substantive standard to be ap­
plied in the case. If we envision a cardinally ranked scale of fairness/ 
unfairness, where the egregiously unfair or wasteful transaction is 
ranked as 0 and the intrinsically fair transaction is ranked as 1, we can 
see that any rule that shifts from a standard of waste to a standard of 
intrinsic fairness involves a major substantive change in the criteria 
applied to the transactions at issue. Many transactions that would 
easily pass muster under the former standard will be struck down 
under the latter. 
Thus far, our analysis of burden-shifting rules implies that such 
rules are not primarily directed at allocating burdens of proof at all, 
but at choosing between two substantive criteria of fairness. These 
implications are mistaken, at least insofar as they imply that there is 
30 Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 (Del. 1987). 
3> Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc., 505 A.2d 757, 764 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
32 Ones Sports v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 26 Ohio St. 3d 15, 26, 496 N.E.2d 959, 
966 (1986); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976). 
33 Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d. 1099, 1106 (Del. 1985); Weinberger 
V. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d. 701, 710 (Del. 1983). 
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some secret code or deception going on, with substantive rules being 
disguised as procedural allocations of proof burdens. 
Our aim is to understand the allocation rules from the perspec­
tive of the judicial finder of fact. To do that, we must further consider 
the effects of judicial uncertainty. We have already seen how, for a 
judge uncertain as to how fair a transaction must be to satisfy the 
requirements of the corporate-law rules^ such terms as intrinsic fair­
ness and entire fairness acquire meanings they might not have when 
considered in the abstract. Such modifications of the mere fairness 
standard tell the judge to resolve all questionable or intermediate 
cases in a particular way (e.g., a transaction price that is only some­
what fair or possibly fair is not intrinsically or entirely fair). 
Consider again the corporate freeze-out at $25 per share. This 
time, however, plaintiff, in an effort to show the price is unfair, puts 
on an expert who testifies that, based on certain assumptions and pro­
jections about the future earnings of the company, the company 
should generate cash and earnings which imply that a fair price for 
the stock at the present is $30 per share. You, as judge, are not par­
ticularly persuaded by the presentation, and assign it a .4 subjective 
probability. Defendants, on the other hand, put forward their own 
view of the future earnings and cash flow potential of the business, 
which implies that the stock has a present fair value of only $24. You 
find this the more persuasive view, and assign it a .6 subjective 
probability. 
Two possible decision-making procedures are now available to 
you as judge. One is to conclude that since a preponderance of the 
evidence favors defendants, (i.e., you assigned a .6 probability that the 
transaction price is fair) you should rule for defendant. If the dis­
puted issue involved the occurence or nonoccurence of some past 
event (e.g., did defendant manufacture the faulty tire) this would seem 
to be the only decision-making procedure available. 
However, when dealing with questions of fairness in valuation, 
the fact that such valuations depend on probability assessments of fu­
ture events, and the fact that intermediate valuations between plain­
tiff's and defendant's assessments are available, means that you as 
judge might approach the decision-making process in another way. 
You might conclude that since there is a .6 likelihood of future events 
which will lead to a present valuation of $24 per share, and a .4 likeli­
hood of future events which will lead to a present valuation of $30, a 
weighted average reflecting the relative likelihood of the occurrence of 
either set of events ((.6 x 24) -I- (.4 x 30)) yields a present value for the 
stock of $26.40 per share. Since $26.40 is more than the $25 per share 
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offered by defendant, the judge applying this method might well con­
clude that defendant had not met its burden of persuasion, even if 
defendant's presentation of evidence was more persuasive than the 
plaintiff's presentation. 
Notice that under this second-mentioned approach to decision­
making, the degree of certainty or confidence which the finder of fact 
has in each side's presentation of the facts is extremely important. 
Returning again to the hypothetical, assume that the finder of fact 
was far more convinced by defendant's case than by plaintiff's, as­
signing their positions subjective probabilities of .9 and .1, respec­
tively. With these assessments, even under a weighted average 
approach, the judge would find the present value of the stock to be no 
more than $24.60 ((.9 x 24) -|- (.1 x 30)) and would rule for 
defendant. 
While the numbers lend these cases a spurious exactitude that 
would not be found in the context of actual litigation, they illustrate 
why it is perfectly possible that a judge, knowing that defendants have 
the burden of proving fairness, and uncertain as between evidence put 
forth by plaintiff and defendant (i.e., she finds both valuations plausi­
ble, even if one is somewhat more plausible than the other), might 
hold that defendant had failed to meet their burden of proof on the 
issue of fairness, even if she thought defendant's presentation was 
somewhat more persuasive. This scenario implies that the party with 
the burden of proof may have to make a far more convincing showing 
than the other party, (as in our example of the .9 and .1 subjective 
probabilities) in order to prevail on the merits. 
This analysis, then, provides a potential answer to the question 
posed in the first section. It describes a decision-making mechanism 
in which the allocation of the burden of proof, as well as the substan­
tive legal standard, can have a major impact on the outcome of the 
case. The analysis implies that the party without the burden may be 
able to prevail by making no more than a plausible case that the trans­
action was unfair (or, where the plaintiff has the burden, that the 
transaction does not constitute waste). 
Two basic questions have to be asked about this analysis: first. Is 
there any indication that judges actually decide cases in this manner? 
and second. Is it proper for judges to do so? The first question, like 
many fundamental issues of judicial process, has no definitive answer. 
Judicial decisions explain and justify the results of the decision-mak­
ing process, but do not provide a record of the process itself, and 
judges are notoriously reticient to discuss their decision-making ^ 
processes outside of the opinions themselves. 
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Nonetheless, the case law in this area does provide some interest-
ling indications that a weighted-average approach which combines fac­
tual claims of value with the judge's subjective probability 
assessments is sometimes utilized by the courts. The old "Delaware 
block" method of valuation, whereby courts would determine the 
value of stock by taking a weighted average of market price, net asset 
value and discounted earnings^'* is a fairly clear indication of such an 
approach. The weightings given to these various valuation techniques 
were not fixed, but were to be determined in the discretion of the indi­
vidual judge, under the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, even 
if a judge believed that market value was the best indication of the 
stock's value, and had a seventy-percent subjective probability of be­
ing correct, the judge could not value the stock at the market price. 
Rather, the judge would assign seventy percent of the final value to 
market price and the other thirty percent to her assessments of the 
relative credibility of the other two valuation techniques. 
Although the Delaware block method is no longer required by 
Delaware courts in valuation proceedings, the discounting of price by 
credibility continues. In the recent case of In Re Appraisal of Shell 
Oil Co.,^^ an appraisal proceeding involving the purchase by Royal 
Dutch Shell of the minority shares of Shell Oil Co., the Delaware 
Court of Chancery was faced with widely diflFering valuations of the 
stock held by the minority shareholders. The minority shareholders 
valued the stock at $89. Royal Dutch Shell's expert valued it at $55. 
The court found that the minority shareholders' evidence was the 
most credible and was therefore entitled to "greater weight."^® Nev­
ertheless, the court proceeded to discount that weightier valuation, 
which still contained some "errors and distortion," by twenty percent, 
to arrive at a valuation of $71.20—a price nowhere near the conten­
tions of either party.^^ 
These results were obtained in appraisal proceedings which, like 
damage calculations, often permit a court to make intermediate deter­
minations reflecting the court's mistrust or uncertainty concerning 
both sides' evidence. In such circumstances, it should be noted, the 
preponderance of the evidence standard plays little or no role. An 
increase in perceived credibility of valuation evidence from forty-five 
to fifty-five percent will not be the difference between winning and 
3^ See, e.g., Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 387 N.E.2d 1145 
(1979). 
35 No. 90-8080, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199 (Dec. 11, 1990). 
36 Id. at *95. 
37 Id. at »95-96. 
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losing, but may simply represent an increment in the assessed valua­
tion of ten percent. 
Liability, however, remains an all-or-nothing determination. In 
deciding whether a plaintiflF has shown waste or whether a defendant 
has satisfied the intrinsic-fairness standard, ultimately only a yes or no 
answer is possible. Yet consider the following quotation from Beard 
V. Elster, a widely cited case in which the Delaware Supreme Court 
was asked to determine whether a stock option plan, approved by dis­
interested directors, constituted a "waste" of corporate assets. The 
court stated: 
We have before us a plan which, in the judgment of a disinter­
ested Board, is adequately designed to further the corporate pur­
pose of securing the retention of key employees' services. It is 
theoretically possible, we suppose, that some businessmen could be 
found who would hold the opinion that options exercisable at once 
were improvidently granted, but, on the other hand, there are busi­
nessmen who would hold a favorable view, as this Board of in­
dependent businessmen in fact did. At most, therefore, we find 
ourselves in the twilight zone where reasonable businessmen, fully 
informed, might differ. We think, therefore, we are precluded from 
substituting our uninformed opinion for that of experienced busi­
ness managers of a corporation who have no personal interest in 
the outcome, and whose sole interest is the furtherance of the cor­
porate enterprise.^' 
The substantive standard for waste, as set forth in Beard v. El­
ster, was that there be a "reasonable assurance" that the option plan 
would provide a benefit to the corporation.'*® In the paragraph just 
quoted, however, the court is unable to make a finding of reasonable 
assurance, but locates the case in a "twilight zone" where reasonable 
businessmen might differ on that issue. One might expect, under a 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, that the court would ask 
which side had made the stronger showing. Instead, the court indi­
cates that the fact that the issue is uncertain and that the plan possibly 
provides benefits is determinative of the issue. 
It is as if the plaintiff had to prove that the plan was "definitely 
unfair," or totally excluded from the set of fair plans, or had a zero 
degree of participation in the set of fair plans. By showing that there 
was at least a possibility that the plan was fair (even if only barely 
fair), defendants had shown by a subjective probability greater than 
zero that the plan was fair to a degree greater than zero. If the mere 
38 39 Del. Ch. 153, 160 A.2d 731 (1960). 
35 Id. at 165, 160 A.2d at 738-39 (emphasis added). 
Id. at 160, 160 A.2d at 736. 
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possibility that the plan is fair (even if a preponderance of the evi­
dence shows otherwise) can be considered, then any plan about which 
such a showing can be made will, on a weighted average, have a value 
greater than zero and will not constitute waste. That, in effect, seems 
to be what Beard v. Elster holds. 
In short, there seems to be some indication that, in considering 
issues of fairness, courts do not really apply a preponderance of the 
evidence standard, but a sliding scale in which the degree of credibil­
ity they ascribe to the evidence is directly related to the degree of 
fairness that the court finds. In such cases, the prime considerations 
will be allocation of the burden of proof and the substantive degree of 
fairness that must be proved. A plaintiff who must prove that the deal 
is very unfair (i.e., waste) may be defeated by a moderate showing 
that the deal is barely fair. A defendant who must prove that the deal 
is very fair (intrinsically fair) may also be defeated by a moderate 
showing that the deal is barely fair. 
Do such results make any sense? A justification of such results in 
terms of the broader structure of corporate law is beyond the scope of 
this paper. I would note, however, that such results are perfectly con­
sistent with a Bayesian analysis of evidence. In determining whether 
$25 is a fair price for stock, it does not violate Bayes' theorem to hold 
that plaintiff should win if plaintiff establishes a forty-percent 
probability that the stock is worth $30, while defendant establishes a 
sixty-percent probability that the stock is worth $24. The key is in 
recognizing that the issue to which this proof is relevant is whether 
the fair value of the stock is greater than $25. Given the fuzziness of 
the property of fairness, a forty-percent likelihood that the stock is 
worth $30 may establish that the Bayesian probability of fair value 
being greater than $25 is substantially more than fifty percent. De­
fendant's showing of a sixty-percent likelihood that the stock is worth 
$24 in contrast, is not a very strong showing that the stock is worth 
less than $25. 
These results do not violate Bayesian principles, but they are dif­
ferent than those that would be obtained in dealing with crisp rather 
than fuzzy properties. If there is a sixty percent probability that de­
fendant breached the contract, and a forty percent probability that he 
did not, one would not conclude that he breached the contract sixty 
percent. One would conclude that, on a preponderance of the evi­
dence, defendant breached the contract. On the question of fairness, 
however, a court might well reach a judgment, either on liability or 
damages, which reflects a 60-40 weighting of the credibility. On an 
intuitive level, it seems perfectly justifiable to multiply the degree of 
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credibility of each piece of evidence by the degree of fairness or un­
fairness presented, so that a moderate showing of substantial unfair­
ness can overcome a stronger showing that the transaction is just 
barely fair. 
I suspect that despite the appearance of crispness implied by syl­
logistic legal rules and binary results (A is either liable or not liable), 
fuzzy predicates play a far larger role in the legal process than is gen­
erally acknowledged in most legal literature. I have tried in a prelimi­
nary way in this paper to suggest some of the ways in which such 
fuzzy reasoning may play a role in the law of corporations. 
